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Abstract 
This study examined the effect of audit committee size on the financial performance of insurance companies in 
Nigeria between the year 2004 and 2015. The study used secondary data obtained from the annual report, National 
Insurance Commission Facts Books and Nigeria Stock Exchange Facts Books of fifteen selected insurance 
companies listed on the Nigeria stock exchange. The collected data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and 
regression analysis. The result revealed a significant negative correlation between audit committee and financial 
performance. The study recommended that the regulatory authorities focus more on other appropriate measure like 
competence (financial expert in committee) and independence of the committee that will ensure check and balance 
framework in the audit exercise and hence positive performance. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Historically, audit activities dates back to the ancient days when the land owners allowed tenant farmers to work 
on their field while the owners were not participating in the farming venture. The land owner relied mainly on 
overseers who listen to the account of stewardship given by the tenants Olowookere (2014). In the modern 
commercial environment, it is important that entities that operates as companies with limited liability should 
produce accounts which will indicate how successful they are performing. Audit is very important if any 
organization strive to attain laudable objective of financial prosperity. The audit has been specifically described as 
‘the independent examination of, and expression of opinion on, the financial statements of an enterprise by an 
appointed auditor in pursuance of that appointment and in compliance with any relevant statutory obligation. 
Section 359, (3&4) of Companies and Allied Matters Act of 1990 recommends the existence of an audit committee 
with not more than six members, and not more than one member as executive director. The Chairman should be a 
non-executive director and the committee is expected to meet at least three times a year. In addition to his report 
to the member’s, the auditor of a public company is required to render a report to the company’s audit committee. 
Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and Riley (2002) study discovered a gap between what audit committees say they are 
doing and what their charter mandated. Even though this gap may be due to numerous reasons including liability 
concerns, it raises the general issue of transparency and accountability with respect to activities of the audit 
committee. The committee is to look at the accounting and reporting policies to ensure its compliance to legal 
requirement and ethical procedure. The committee is expected to resolve every audit logjam that may arise from 
both interim and final audit report with the management and ensure necessary compliance to recommendations 
stated in the report. 
The contents of the auditor’s report derive from the functions and objectives of the audit committee, which 
are discussed below. 
           
1.1 Statement of Problems 
The audit committee is established to provide a body of people who are independent of management and to which 
the external auditor can relate with and should be able to resolve problems that could arise in the management of 
an entity. The committee is expected to be in a position of deterrent to executive directors that carries on unlawful 
acts that are not in the interest of the stakeholders. However, in order to carry out its responsibilities and add 
positively to effective internal control and prevent corporate governance failure, the appropriate constitution of the 
committee is required. Bédard, Chtourou and Courteou (2004), argue that the larger the audit committee is more 
likely to discover and resolve likely problems in the financial reporting process. However, small audit committees 
that is not large enough e.g with one or two members could be regarded as weak because it will be easy for 
management to exert pressure on them to gain its support when there is any dispute with the auditor. It may be 
difficult to obtain sufficient numbers of non-executive directors in a company with a good appreciation of the 
auditor’s work to constitute the audit committee. Most corporate failure in Nigeria has been attributed to ineffective 
and inefficient audit committee (Ebere & Ibanichka, 2016). This therefore shows the importance of audit 
committee in corporate performance of organizations. Study relating to importance of Audit Committee 
independence was conducted by DeZoort and Salterio (2001) with the result revealing greater support for auditor 
in an accounting dispute case with increased independent director experience and audit knowledge using 68 audit 
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committees in their sample.  
 
1.2 Objective of the Study 
  The objective of this study is to establish the impact of audit committee on financial performance of insurance 
companies in Nigeria. 
 
2.0 Theoretical Framework 
2.0.1 The Agency Theory 
The agency theory of corporate governance which was developed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976, sees 
shareholders as the principals and management as their agents.  They confirm that agents will love to maximize 
their monetary reward, job stability and other perks, and they will do no more than seek to pacify the shareholders. 
Nonetheless, there is a need to strictly monitor their activities so as to ensure that their principal’s best interests 
are served. This theory is the anchor of today’s corporate governance activity. 
Corporate governance focused on separation of ownership and control which results in principal-agent 
problems arising from the dispersed ownership in the modern corporation (Berle & Means 1932). They viewed 
corporate governance as a device where a board of director is essentially a monitoring mechanism to maximize 
the problems brought about by principal agency connection. Mallin (2004), explained in this context that agents 
are managers, principal are owners and board of directors are monitoring device. Many researchers have examined 
the board composition due to the importance of the monitoring and governance function of the board (Barnhart, 
Mar & Rosentein 1994: Pearce & Zahra 1992: Gales & Kesner 1994). They confirm that agency theory considers 
that the primary responsibility of board of directors is towards the shareholders to ensure maximization of their 
wealth. 
2.0.2 The Stewardship Theory 
This was propounded by Donaldson and Davis in 1991. The theory states that, since people can be allowed and 
trusted to act in the public good in general and the interest of their shareholders in particular, it will be necessary 
to create operational and authority structures. This will provide unified command and facilitate autonomous 
decision making, enable companies to act (and react) quickly and decisively to market opportunities. According 
to this theory, managers represented by the board of directors are considered a good stewardship that will actually 
act in the best interest of owners. Donaldson and davis (1991), observe a strong connection between managers and 
firm good performance thereby protecting and optimizing the shareholders value. It is expected that acting in the 
best interest of the owner will lead to firm success. 
2.0.3 The Stakeholders Theory 
This was developed by Freeman in 1984 with belief that accountability should be made to the stakeholders instead 
of only shareholders. “The firm” is a system of stake holders operating within the larger system of the host society 
that provides the necessary legal and market infrastructure for the firm’s activities. The purpose of the firms is to 
create wealth or value for its stake holders by converting their stakes into goods and services. World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development identified stakeholders as the representative from labour organization, 
academia, church, indigenous people, government, non-government organization, customers/consumers, 
communities, employees, legislators and human right groups. Narrow attention on shareholders by the board of 
directors has now been increased to the stakeholders interest (Smallman, 2004). This, perhaps account for reason 
why royal fathers, labour movement, academia e.t.c in Nigeria are represented and feature prominently in board 
composition of many organizations. 
2.0.4 The Signalling Theory 
This theory on corporate disclosure considered information asymmetry very important for better performance. 
According to the theory, any organization that could provide reliable information with transparency will definitely 
signal better corporate governance performance. Chiang, (2005) confirm that organizations that operates better 
corporate governance signal better performance. Spence (1973) affirmed that a company can reduce or remove the 
information asymmetry by providing information to various investors. The existence of information asymmetry 
creates a misunderstanding of the company’s operation or dealings by the investors which may hamper their 
reliance in making investment decision (Poitevin, 1990; Ravid & Saring, 1991). 
 
2.1 Empirical Review 
2.1.1 Audit Committee Size and Firm Performance 
 Studies, carried out by Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996), noticed that the number of 
members on an audit committee actually have effects on its decisions. Bédard, Chtourou and Courteou (2004), 
argue that the larger the audit committee is more likely to discover and resolve likely problems in the financial 
reporting process. This is because of the strength and divergent of views with different expertise they possess 
which would ensure effective monitoring. Furthermore, Chen and Zhou (2007) study find that firms with a bigger 
audit committee, due to reputation mostly assign the Big 4 auditors for audit engagement. Braiotta (2006) argue 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) DOI: 10.7176/RJFA 
Vol.10, No.14, 2019 
 
12 
for a large size audit committee members with a diverse professional judgment and experience but not to 
unmanageable size. However, small audit committees that is not large enough e.g with one or two members could 
be regarded as weak because it will be easy for management to exert pressure on them to gain its support when 
there is any dispute with the auditor.. Empirical studies show mixed result on the effect of audit committee size on 
performance. Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) and Bédard et al. (2004) find no significant association between 
audit committee size, measured by the number of directors on the committee, and performance management. This 
is also supported by the study of Abbott, Park and Parker (2004), which find negative relationship between audit 
committee size and reporting quality. However, Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) study the extent of the effectiveness 
of the audit committee size in reducing earnings management of Malaysian quoted companies. Their study reveals 
positive association between audit committee size and performance management. This indicates that a certain 
minimum number of audit committee members may be vital to firm performance. 
2.1.2 Audit Committee and Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Carcello et al. (2002) study found gap between what audit committees say they are doing and what their charter 
mandated. Even though this gap may be due to numerous reasons including liability concerns, it raises the general 
issue of transparency and accountability with respect to activities of the audit committee.  
Study relating to importance of Audit Committee independence was conducted by DeZoort and Salterio (2001) 
with the result revealing greater support for auditor in an accounting dispute case with increased independent 
director experience and audit knowledge using 68 audit committees in their sample. They found out that there is 
no affect for level of accounting knowledge.  
DeZoort and Salterio (2001) examined the effects of Independence director experience; audit knowledge on 
Support for management or auditor and discovered that there is a better support for auditor in an accounting 
disputes situation with increased independent director experience and audit knowledge. The latter finding may 
have been due to the non-technical, generic nature of the accounting issue at hand. Audit Committee’s may be 
firmed primarily for cosmetic reasons to make it appear to outside stakeholders that the company desires 
monitoring of financial reporting and controls.   
Fogarty and Kalbers (1998), using data from their earlier study in 1993 discovered weakness association 
between Agency Theory factors and Audit Committee effectiveness. Collier and Gregory (1999) used 142 UK 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange with result showing little support for the findings of Menon and 
Williams (1994) that confirm positive relationship between the Big 6 and leverage and Audit Committee activity.  
Survey of Haka and Chalos (1990) concluded that Audit committee chairs are consistently different from 
other groups on what should constitute full disclosure (with audit committee members wanting greater disclosure). 
Krishnamoorthy (2002), established in their investigation that it is important to distinguish between the “form” 
(meeting regulatory requirements) and the “substance,” (the effectiveness) of audit committees. Management 
exerts a significant influence over the quality of the interactions between the audit committee and the external 
auditor..  
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996), result shows that firms subject to AAERs (accounting and auditing 
enforcement releases) are more likely to influence earnings to achieve lower cost of external financing. Beasley 
(1996) study evaluates the effect of corporate governance mechanism on fraud and discovered that larger 
percentage of outside members on board reduces fraud likelihood.  
In their subsequent study, Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides (2000), found that fraud companies in 
all 3 industries studied are less likely to have independent audit committees, outsiders on the board and to have an 
internal audit function.  
Abbott et al. (2000) was able to conclude that Independence together with activity of the Audit Committee is 
associated with a lower incidence of AAER. Klein (2002) report of studies carried out on corporate governance 
mechanism and abnormal accrual in the books established negative relationship between board/audit committee 
independence and abnormal accruals. In their subsequent study, Abbott et.al. (2000) findings reveals that 
misstatement is affected by presence of a completely independent audit committee holding a minimum number of 
meetings while not significant are expertise and Characteristics of the Board of Directors . Wild (1996), result 
suggest that the audit committees provide a useful oversight mechanism for the financial reporting process and 
that this increased oversight results in improved earnings quality. 
Abbott and Parker (2000) study concluded that Audit committees that are both independent and active are 
positively associated with selection of an industry specialist. Beasley and Petroni (2001) in their survey examining 
the percentage of outside directors on the board of 165 firms confirm that the likelihood that a specialist Big-6 
auditor is selected increases with the percentage of outside directors on the board, but the outside board 
membership percentage has no impact on the choice between a non specialist Big-6 and non Big-6 Auditor.  
 
3.0 Research Methodology 
3.0.1 Study Population and sample 
The population for this study consists of all the 35 insurance companies listed on the floor of Nigeria stock 
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exchange market out of which purposive sample was used in selecting the fifteen (15) listed insurance companies. 
These insurance companies were chosen because of their consistency on stock exchange market listing during the 
period of the study. 
3.0.2 Data Gathering Method 
Secondary data derived from the annual report of the insurance companies listed in the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE) during the twelve years period of 2004 and 2015 was used for the study with other related materials 
particularly the National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) and the Nigerian Stock Exchange database and Fact 
Books.  
3.0.3 Model Specification 
This study employed a modified version of the econometric model of Ntim and Ossei (2006).  
These models are as follows; 
MODEL 1 Relationship between audit committee and ROE 


 
n
i
ititiitit CONTROLSAUDCOMROE
1
11110   ……………………….……...............  (1) 
MODEL 2 Relationship between audit committee and ROA 


 
n
i
ititiitit CONTROLSAUDCOMROA
1
11110   ………………………..………………(2) 
MODEL 3 Relationship between audit committee and Tobin’s Q 


 
n
i
ititiitit CONTROLSAUDCOMTQ
1
11110   ……………………….………….     (3)                                                                                                                             
Where: 
ROE, ROA and TQ are the main dependent variables; AUDCOM is the main explanatory variable. CONTROLS 
refer to the control variables, including BOSt, DEIt, CGDIt, and BACT.  
Dependent variables 
ROE = Return on Equity  
ROA = Return on Asset 
TQ = Tobin’s Q 
Independent variables 
BACT = Board Activism 
BOS= Board Structure  
DEI= Directors’ Equity Interest 
CGDI = Corporate Governance Disclosure Index   
AUDCOM = Audit Committee 
et, = Error Term  
The a priori expectation is such that:  
BACTt BOSt, DEIt, CGDIt, and AUDCOMt > 0.  A positive relationship is expected between explanatory 
variables (BOSt, DEIt, CGDIt, AUDCOMt and BACTt) and the dependent variables (ROE, ROA and Tobin’s 
Q). The correlation coefficient (o) will help explaining the various levels of association between the 
independent variables. 
3.0.4 Descriptions of Variables and Measurement 
The variables used in the model are as described and measured below: 
ROA = Return On Asset. This is measured as the ratio of Earning Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) to Total 
Asset.  
ROE = Return on Equity. This is measured as the ratio of Earning Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) to Ordinary 
Shares. 
Tobin’s Q = Market Value of Equity + Total Debt/Total Assets 
BACT = Number of board meetings held during a financial year 
BOS = Proportion of outside directors sitting on the board. 
 DEI = Directors ordinary shares as a percentage of total outstanding shares of the firm 
CGDI = Ratio of total score of the Individual company to maximum Possible score obtainable by company. 
AUDCOM = Number of member in the committee. 
3.0.5 Data Analysis Method 
Panel data regression analysis methodology that combined time series and cross sectional data was used to measure 
the degree of association between disclosure and performance  
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4.0 Data Analysis 
4.0.1 Descriptive Analysis 
This section presents summary of the descriptive characteristics of all variables used in the study. Statistics 
reported under this section include mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the pooled observations 
of all variables across unit and time period i.e 15 insurance companies over 12 years period spanning from 2004 
to 2015. Summary of the descriptive statistics is presented in table 4.1 below: 
Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
   Variable |     Obs            Mean           Std. Dev.           Min           Max 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |       180             0.27            0.4677           -1.41               2.78 
         roa |       180            0.066             0.16.            -7.93              1.099 
          tq |        180            1.10              0.749            0.266             4.888 
         bos |       180           0.719             0.1151           0.40               0.90 
         dei |       180           0.2193            0.119            0.008              0.46 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        cgdi |       180           0.725             0.695            0.30                 0. 92 
     audcom |     180            0.94              0.138            0. 67                1.00 
        bact |       180           0.933              0.11             0.75                 1.00 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   
Source: Author’s Computation (2018) 
Table 4.1 report the average values of all the variables both dependent and independent alike. The table above 
reported average value of 27% for return on equity, 6.5% for return on asset, 110% for Tobin’s Q. Given the 
reported average values of the three dependent variables it stands that across the 15 insurance companies sampled 
in the study over the period of 12 years spanning from 2004 to 2015, the average ratio of earnings before interest 
rate to ordinary share (return on equity) is 27%, average ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total asset 
(return on asset) is 6.5% while the average ratio of the sum of market value of equity and total debt to total asset 
stood at110%. As reported in table 4.1 the average value of AUDCOM size was 94%. The reported means value 
of audit committee revealed that the average audit committee for the sampled insurance companies over the period 
understudied stood at 94% in size using the Company and allied matter decree of 1990 as amended of maximum 
of 6 members for a guide. The standard deviation stood at 13.9% which is a reflection of the average dispersion of 
the distribution of the distribution of observations corresponding to each of the variables from the centre. The 
minimum and maximum return on equity (ROE) across cross sectional unit over the period covered in the study 
stood at -141% and 278%. For return on asset (ROA) the minimum and maximum values stood at -79.13% and 
109.9%, while for Tobin’s Q the minimum and maximum statistics stood at 26.56% and 488.8% respectively. The 
reported minimum and maximum values of audit committee stood at 67% and 100%. 
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4.2 Regression Analysis 
Table 4.2 Regression Analysis for model 1 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/04/18   Time: 16:46   
Sample: 2004 2015   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 15   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 180  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     AUDCOM -1.228820 0.495167 -2.481628 0.0141 
BACT -1.078711 0.853915 -1.263254 0.2083 
BOS -0.629518 0.333995 -1.884812 0.0613 
CGDI -0.032318 0.014182 -2.278763 0.0240 
DEI 0.217282 0.377767 0.575173 0.5660 
C 285.6675 123.2125 2.318495 0.0217 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.260470    Mean dependent var 26.56650 
Adjusted R-squared 0.172651    S.D. dependent var 46.79982 
S.E. of regression 42.56853    Akaike info criterion 10.44455 
Sum squared resid 289932.8    Schwarz criterion 10.79932 
Log likelihood -920.0092    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.58839 
F-statistic 2.965977    Durbin-Watson stat 1.429042 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000101    
     
     
Source: Author’s Computation (2018) 
From the table above for model 1, it was reported that main explanatory variable of AUDCOM and control 
variables except DEI showed a negative coefficient. In the table above, the AUDCOM revealed coefficient of -
1.228820 with corresponding probability of 0.0141. The result showed that our main variables of AUDCOM exert 
a negative and significant impact on financial performance measured in terms of ROE. Moreover, increasing the 
size of AUDCOM by one unit will lead to decrease in performance by -1.22820. The R2 of 0.260470 implies that 
about 26% of the systematic variation in financial performance measured in terms of ROE is jointly explained by 
explanatory variables. The P- value < 0.05 revealed significant joint impact of explanatory variables on financial 
performance. AUDCOM has significant impact on ROE at probability value of 0.0141. 
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Table 4.3 Regression Analysis for model 2 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/04/18   Time: 16:50   
Sample: 2004 2015   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 15   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 180  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     AUDCOM -0.351431 0.174982 -2.008378 0.0464 
BACT -0.376311 0.338965 -1.110176 0.2687 
BOS -0.058382 0.083719 -0.697355 0.4867 
CGDI -0.003912 0.001999 -1.957195 0.0522 
DEI 0.145122 0.110255 1.316238 0.1901 
C 76.18535 43.32908 1.758296 0.0808 
     
      Effects Specification   
      
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.350784    Mean dependent var 6.638611 
Adjusted R-squared 0.220069    S.D. dependent var 16.20316 
S.E. of regression 14.30961    Akaike info criterion 8.315173 
Sum squared resid 30509.97    Schwarz criterion 8.865072 
Log likelihood -717.3656    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.538133 
F-statistic 2.683586    Durbin-Watson stat 1.246849 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000047    
     
     Source: Author’s Computation (2018) 
The table above revealed that main independent variable of AUDCOM and control variables except DEI 
again showed a negative coefficient. The AUDCOM revealed coefficient of -0.351431 with corresponding 
probability of 0.0464. The result showed that our main variables of AUDCOM exert a negative and significant 
impact on financial performance measured in terms of ROA. The result further revealed that an attempt to increase 
the size of AUDCOM by one unit will lead to decrease in performance by -0.351431. The R2 of 0.350784 implies 
that about 35% of the variation in performance measured in terms of ROA is jointly explained by independent 
variables. The P- value < 0.05 revealed significant joint impact of explanatory variables on financial performance. 
AUDCOM has significant effect on ROA at probability value of 0.0464 
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Table 4.4 Regression Analysis for Model 3 
Dependent Variable: TOBQ   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
Date: 04/04/18   Time: 16:24   
Sample: 2004 2015   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 15   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 180  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
      CGDI 0.206471 0.007627 27.06970 0.0000 
BOS -0.992150 0.515113 -1.926082 0.0559 
BACT -0.050469 0.194839 -0.259030 0.7959 
AUDCOM -0.905279 0.417797 -2.166794 0.0317 
DEI 0.108734 0.268000 0.405723 0.6855 
C 253.8445 61.57883 4.122269 0.0001 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.592971    Mean dependent var 170.2375 
Adjusted R-squared 0.544636    S.D. dependent var 159.9590 
S.E. of regression 72.44884    Sum squared resid 839813.5 
F-statistic 12.26802    Durbin-Watson stat 1.668004 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.111304    Mean dependent var 110.1866 
Sum squared resid 886727.1    Durbin-Watson stat 1.790629 
     
     
Source: Author’s Computation (2018) 
The table above for model 3 reported that AUDCOM and control variables except CGDI and DEI showed a 
negative coefficient. In the table above, the AUDCOM revealed coefficient of -0.905279 with corresponding 
probability of 0.0317. The result showed a negative and significant relationship between AUDCOM and financial 
performance measured in terms of Tobin’s Q Moreover, increasing the size of AUDCOM by one unit will lead to 
decrease in performance by -0.905279. The R2 of 0.592971 implies that about 59% of the systematic variation in 
financial performance measured in terms of Tobin’s Q is jointly explained by explanatory variables. The P- value 
< 0.05 revealed significant joint impact of explanatory variables on financial performance. AUDCOM has 
significant impact on Tobin’s Q at probability value of 0.0317. 
 
5.0 Summary and Conclusion 
Audit committee reveals significantly negative impact on performance measured in terms of return on equity, 
return on asset and Tobin’s Q. This finding is in congruence with previous empirical studies of. Xie et al. (2003) 
and Bédard et al. (2004) that find negative association between audit committee size, measured by the number of 
directors on the committee, and performance management. This is also supported by the study of Abbott et al. 
(2004) that find negative relationship between audit committee size and reporting quality. The finding however, 
disagreed with the result of Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) that reveals positive association between audit 
committee size and performance management. This indicates that a certain number of audit committee members 
may be vital to firm performance. 
5.0.1Recommendation 
Since there is negative relationship between number of audit committee member and performance, it is necessary 
that the code of insurance corporate governance in Nigeria release by NAICOM look at compliance to other 
appropriate measure like competence (financial expert in committee) and independence of the committee that will 
ensure check and balance framework in the audit exercise and hence positive performance.  
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